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Abstract
Poker is one of the most popular card games, whose rational investigation represents also one
of the major challenges in several scientific areas, spanning from information theory and artificial
intelligence to game theory and statistical physics. In principle, several variants of Poker can
be identified, although all of them make use of money to make the challenge meaningful and,
moreover, can be played in two different formats: tournament and cash game. An important issue
when dealing with Poker is its classification, i.e., as a ‘skill game’ or as gambling. Nowadays,
its classification still represents an open question, having a long list of implications (e.g., legal
and healthcare) that vary from country to country. In this study, we analyze Poker challenges,
considering the cash game format, in terms of thermodynamics systems. Notably, we propose a
framework to represent a cash game Poker challenge that, although based on a simplified scenario,
allows both to obtain useful information for rounders (i.e., Poker players), and to evaluate the
role of Poker room in this context. Finally, starting from a model based on thermodynamics, we
show the evolution of a Poker challenge, making a direct connection with the probability theory
underlying its dynamics and finding that, even if we consider these games as ‘skill games’, to take
a real profit from Poker is really hard.
∗ marcojavarone@gmail.com
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I. INTRODUCTION
Today understanding Poker games, from the mental aptitide of their players to the under-
lying probabilistic structure, represents a great challenge for scientists belonging to several
communities as psychologists, computer scientists, physicists, and mathematicians [1–4]. In
general, these games can be analyzed considering psychological aspects, information theory
approaches and analytical descriptions. Notably, approaches based on sociophysics [5–9]
allow to study the role of human behavior [3, 10]. On the other hand, information theory
and analytical approaches allow to identify both new algorithms [4, 11] in the context of ar-
tificial intelligence [12], and universal properties of these games [2]. An interesting problem,
when dealing with Poker, is constituted by its classification, i.e., ‘skill game’ or gambling.
This issue has not yet been solved, although the nowadays available related answer has a
long list of implications [13, 14]. A preliminary attempt to solve this question, by using the
framework of statistical mechanics, has been developed in [3], where the author analyzed
the role of rationality in a simplified scenario, referred to the Poker variant called Texas
Hold’em [15]. In general, all variants follow a similar logic: rounders (i.e., Poker players)
receive a number of cards, and have to decide if to bet or not, by computing the possible
combinations they can set with their cards (called hand). After evaluating if the received
hand is promising or not, each rounder can take part to the pot by placing a bet (money or
chips), otherwise she/he folds the hand. Therefore, the use of money makes the challenge
meaningful, otherwise none would have a reason to fold her/his hand. Poker challenges can
follow two different formats, i.e., cash game or tournament. During a tournament, rounders
pay, only once, an entry fee: a fraction goes into the prize pool, and the remain part is a fee
to play. Eventually, top players share the prize pool (usually money). On the other hand,
playing Poker in the cash game format means to use real money during the challenge. In
this case, rounders can play until they have money and, although there no entry fees to pay,
a fraction of each pot is taxed, i.e., a small ‘rake’ is applied. In this work, we propose a
framework to study the evolution of a Poker challenge, considering the cash game format,
by a thermodynamic description. In particular, we aim both to model these dynamics to
achieve insights, and to link the resulting thermodynamic description with the probability
theory tacitly governing these games.
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II. MAPPING POKER TO A THERMODYNAMIC SYSTEM
In this work, we aim to describe cash game Poker challenges by the language of ther-
modynamics. In particular, since these challenges entail transfers of money among different
parts, i.e., rounders and dealers, we assume that the way thermodynamics explains equilibria
and energy transfers between systems constitutes a fundamental tool to our investigations.
Firstly, we consider a simple thermodynamic system composed of the subsystem S and its
environment R. The total energy of the system ET is given by the energy of S and that of
R, i.e., ET = ES +ER. In the proposed model, the environment R is a Poker room, whereas
S corresponds to the table where two rounders, say A and B, face by a ‘heads-up’ challenge.
A ‘heads-up’ is a challenge characterized by the presence of only two rounders. Therefore,
we can identify two subsystems of S: SA and SB, corresponding to the two rounders. Since
Poker challenges are performed following the cash game format, the money is the exchanged
quantity, hence mapping money to the energy of the systems come immediate. In doing
so, we have EA and EB that correspond to the money of A and B, respectively. Therefore
ES = EA + EB and, as initial condition, we impose that at t = 0 rounders have the same
amount of money, i.e., EA(0) = EB(0). Figure 1 offers a pictorial representation of the
described system. During the challenge, some rounds are won by A and others by B; hence
FIG. 1. Thermodynamic representation of a cash game Poker challenge. On the left, the subsystem
S inside the environment R, with the arrow indicating the allowed direction of energy transfers,
i.e., from S to R. On the right, a zoom on the subsystem S, showing the two subsystems SA and
SB, representing the two rounders (i.e., A and B). Inside S, as shown by arrows, the energy can
flow from SA to SB and vice versa.
a fraction of energy is transferred from the subsystem SA to SB, and vice versa, over time.
The amount of transferred energy ∆S corresponds to the total amount of money that flows
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from A to B and vice versa. For the sake of simplicity, we consider that at each round
rounders bet the same amount of money, i.e., pots are constant. In particular, ∆S is defined
as
∆S(t) = ΦA,B(t) + ΦB,A(t) (1)
with Φx,y(t) total flow of energy from the subsystem x to y, at time t. Then, ΦA,B indicates
the total amount of enegy transferred from SA to SB, as result of all successes of the rounder
B. It is worth to note that, in real scenarios, Poker rooms apply a small fee, called ‘rake’,
to each pot. Usually, the ‘rake’ corresponds to about 5% of the pot. As result, the total
energy of S decreases over time by a factor ∆S · , due to energy transfers between SA and
SB. Since we are dealing with a closed system (i.e., S), the loss in energy can be thought in
terms of energy reduction due to the entropy’s growth σ. Notably, this concept characterizes
the Helmholtz free energy potential F
F = E − Tσ (2)
with E and T , energy and temperature of the system, respectively. In few words, the free
energy corresponds to the energy a system can actually use. Then, we can map this concept
to our model by the following relation
FS(t) = ES(t)−∆S(t) ·  (3)
with FS(t) free energy of our system, that is available at time t, after all energy transfers.
The energy lost by S goes to the environment R, hence ER = ∆S(t) ·. It is worth to observe
that, as the entropy of a system does, the quantity ∆S(t) ·  increases over time, and can
never be negative.
A. Evolution of the System
Now, we focus our attention on the evolution of the system. In particular, we consider
one subsystem, i.e., SA or SB, in order to analyze its amount of energy over time. Let us
consider, for instance, SA (that represents the rounder A) whose evolution can be described
by the following relation
EA(t) = EA(0)− ΦA,B(t) + ΦB,A(t) · (1− ) (4)
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as the amount of energy in SA corresponds to the initial amount of energy in this subsystem
(i.e., Ea(0)), minus the amount of energy that flowed to SB (i.e., ΦA,B(t)), plus the amount
of energy that flowed from SB to SA (i.e., ΦB,A(t)) reduced of a factor . In an equilibrium
condition, limt→∞EA(t) = EA(0), therefore
ΦA,B(t) = ΦB,A(t) · (1− ) (5)
The primary target of the rounder A is to win all the money of B, while avoiding to lose
her/his money. Hence, rounder A aims to obtain EA(t) ≥ EA(0). Considering Poker as
a skill game [3], the flow Φx,y depends on the ability of the yth rounder. Then, A has a
probability Pa to win each round, strongly related to her/his skills. As discussed before, to
simplify the scenario, we suppose that rounders bet always the same amount of money δ
2
,
forming the pot δ, so that ∆S(t) = δ · t. In doing so, we can define the amount of energy
transferred from SB to SA as
ΦB,A = Pa ·∆S (6)
and the amount of energy transferred from SA to SB
ΦA,B = (1− Pa) ·∆S (7)
Going back to the equilibrium condition defined in Equation 5, we can write
Pa ·∆S · (1− ) = (1− Pa) ·∆S (8)
working a little bit of algebra, from Equation 8, we obtain
Pa =
1
2−  (9)
Therefore, we can compute the minimal success probability that the rounder A needs to reach
her/his target, i.e., to win (or, at least, to not losing money). It is worth to highlight that,
starting by a thermodynamic description of the system, we can define a relation between the
‘rake’, applied by a Poker room, and the rounders’ skills, i.e., their probability to success in
Poker cash game.
B. Profits over time
In light of these results, it is interesting to evaluate both the amount of money rounders
can win by playing Poker cash game, and the amount of money the Poker room generates
5
during the challenge. Considering the rounders’s perspective, we are interested in computing
the expected value of energy that flows in the subsystem SA, i.e., < ∆EA > (note that similar
considerations hold also for SB). The value of < ∆EA > can be computed as follows
< ∆EA >=< ΦB,A > ·(1− )− < ΦA,B > (10)
< ΦB,A > corresponds to < ΦB,A >= Pa · ϕB,A, and < ΦA,B >= (1 − Pa) · ϕA,B, with ϕx,y
representing the total energy transfer from Sx to Sy, i.e., ϕ = t · δ2 . Then, we obtain
< ∆EA >= PA · t · δ
2
· (1− )− (1− PA) · t · δ
2
(11)
and we find the following relation
< ∆EA >= t · δ
2
[PA · (1− )− 1 + PA] = t · δ
2
[PA · (2− )− 1] (12)
that is in perfect accordance with results achieved in Equation 9, as for Pa =
1
2− the
expected value of energy transferred to SA is < ∆EA >= 0. Moreover, it is immediate to
note that, considering Equation 4, the rate of variation of the energy of one subsystem (e.g.,
Sx) corresponds to
dEx
dt
=
< ∆Ex >
t
(13)
It is worth to observe that, by all the illustrated equations, it is possible to evaluate the
potential gain of a rounder, once her/his winning probability Px is known. On the other
hand, considering the Poker room perspective, the overall scenario becomes pretty nice,
because as we are going to show, its profits can only increases over time without running
any risk. Notably, the environment R (i.e., the Poker room) receives a constant amount
of energy, at each time step, equal to δ · . Hence, in the event rounders have the same
probability to win (i.e., PA = PB), it is interesting to compute the number of time steps
required to let the Poker room drain almost all their money (i.e., their energy). Since to
perform a round both rounders have to bet the same amount of money, a minimal amount
of energy always will remain in the subsystem S. In particular, this quantity is equal to δ
2
.
Hence, supposing both subsystems, at time t, contain an energy equal to δ
2
, the last round
entails one subsystem loses completely energy and the other has, at the end, an energy equal
to δ(1− ). Therefore, the maximum amount of energy that the environment can receive is
2 · Es(0)− δ(1− ), so that the following relation holds
∆st = 2Es(0)− δ(1− ) (14)
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then, it is possible to compute the number of time steps t to let the Poker room draining
almost all the rounders’s money:
t =
2Es(0)− δ(1− )
∆s
(15)
Equation 15 shows a direct relation between the time and the rake applied by the Poker
room: as the latter increases the time to drain almost all the energy decreases.
III. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
In this work, we propose a framework for studying Poker challenges in the context of
thermodynamics. In particular, we map a simple scenario, where two rounders face, to a
thermodynamic system composed of a subsystem S embedded in a larger environment R.
The former represents the two rounders, whereas the latter the Poker room. Remarkably,
from a simplified description of the game dynamics, we achieve insights on Poker challenges,
in the cash game format. Even considering this format of Poker as a ‘skill game’ (see [3]), we
identify a direct link between the rounders’s skills and the fee applied by Poker room, called
‘rake’. In doing so, it is possible to know the minimal probability to success a rounder needs
to have in order to be a successful player. As shown, gaining by this activity is a very hard
task, even for skilled rounders, as they have to keep their probability to win very high. In real
scenarios, many expert rounders are very good and fast in computing winning probabilities
for their hands, hence they perform online cash game by a ‘multitabling’ strategy: they
face at the same time several opponents, with the aim to optimize their profits (obviously,
increasing the probability of losing a lot of money). Moreover, we analyze profits of a
Poker room, obtained while rounders play the cash game Poker. In particular, mapping
this profit to the energy of the environment R, we achieve the relation ER(, t) = δt, with
 representing the ‘rake’, δ the pot of each round, and t the number of time steps. It is
worth noting that there are two different situations that allow the Poker room to increase
its profits:
1. Increasing 
2. Increasing t
While the first should be kept low (e.g., %5 or less) as a strategy marketing to attract
rounders in the Poker room, the second requires more attention as, in principle, it can lead
7
to a fraudulent strategy, now we briefly illustrate. People usually are not worried about
frauds in Poker, as they play against other people, and not against a dealer (as in games like
the roulette). Therefore, in principle, there are no reasons for the electronic dealer to favor a
particular rounder in the process of cards distribution. Anyway, it is important to highlight
that the Poker room does not take an advantage when rounders perform ‘all-in’ actions
(i.e., the bet all their money in only one hand). Then, supposing rounders are rational, i.e.,
their actions are performed by considering their probability to win each round, a pseudo-
random algorithm for cards distribution could be properly defined for generating uncertain
scenarios. Here, for uncertain scenarios we indicate those situations where both rounders
have low winning probabilities, by considering only the information they have (i.e., their
hand and, in case, common cards). Therefore, a fraudulent strategy could be implemented
by using an algorithm to provide rounders with low winning probability at each hand, in
order to avoid they perform ‘all-in’. It is evident that by this strategy, it would be possible
to indirectly increasing t for each challenge. Moreover, it would be also very difficult to
find this kind of fraud by analyzing the algorithm, used by a Poker room, if this fraudulent
scenario is not considered. In order to conclude, we would like to emphasize that some of
the considerations about the probability to win a cash game challenge can be applied also
in the context of financial trading. In particular, for the strategy adopted by ‘scalpers’, i.e.,
traders that in few seconds open and close a position (i.e., buy and sell financial products as
stocks, bonds, etc.), as also in those cases for each transaction the banking system applies
a kind of ‘rake’.
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